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Abstract. In AFRICACRYPT 2010, Abdalla et al. first proposed a
slight modification to the computations steps of the BD protocol, called
mBD+P. Then they extended mBD+P protocol into mBD+S protocol.
In this paper, we show that both of mBD+P and mBD+S protocols
are vulnerable to malicious insiders attack. Further, we propose a simple
countermeasure against this attack.
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1 Introduction
Group key exchange (GKE) enables three or more parties to agree upon a com-
mon secret session key in the open network for secure group communication.
However, GKE protocols is currently less well understood than the case of two-
party key exchange protocols. Many security attributes have so far been ignored
for the case of GKE protocols.
In 2009, Manulis proposed flexible GKE protocols [1] utilizing the well-known
parallel Diffie-Hellman key exchange (PDHKE) technique in which each party
uses the same exponent for the computation of peer-to-peer (p2p) keys with its
peers. Further, Manulis investigated possible optimizations of these protocols
allowing parties to re-use their exponents to compute both group and p2p keys,
and showed that not all such GKE protocols could be optimized, which included
the original Burmester-Desmedt (BD) GKE protocol [2].
Recently, Abdalla et al. used the more generalized and flexible approach than
Manulis’s scheme to propose two GKE protocols: mBD+P and mBD+S [3],
which are based on the well-studied BD GKE protocol. The mBD+P protocol
is modified for obtaining the secure merge of BD and PDHKE. The mBD+S
protocol as the extension of the mBD+P protocol gets the ability to compute
an independent session key for any possible subgroup of the initial GKE users.
In addition, the authentication procedure in their protocols is similar to the
general authentication technique from [4] and both of mBD+P and mBD+S
protocols are proven the security in the random oracle model. In this paper, we
will show that their protocols are vulnerable to malicious insider attack. Under
our attack, malicious insiders can disrupt establishment of a common group
session key among all group members. Furthermore, we improve their protocols
and use key confirmation technique to overcome this secure flaw.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review
Abdalla et al.’s protocols. In Section 3, we show that their protocols can’t resist
malicious insiders attack. In Section 4, we propose our improvement to repair
this secure flaw. Finally, the conclusions will be given in Section 5.
2 Review of mBD+P and mBD+S Protocols
In this section, we briefly review mBD+P and mBD+S protocols proposed by
Abdalla et al. in 2010. In Table 1, we list the abbreviations and notations used
in mBD+P and mBD+S protocols. For more details, we refer to [3].
Table 1. The notations
Notations Description
q A large prime
τ Security parameter
G A cyclic additive group of order q
Hg,Hp,Hs Random oracles from {0, 1}
∗ to {0, 1}τ
H Random oracle from G to {0, 1}τ
n The number of users
U1, U2, ..., Un−1, Un Users
Sign A digital signature scheme
ski Signature private key
pki Verification public key
2.1 mBD+P Protocol
In this subsection, we briefly review the mBD+P protocol, which includes two
stages: group stage and p2p stage. On the correctness of key computation and
the security analysis of the mBD+P protocol refer to [3].
Group Stage Let the group users be defined by pid=(U1, ..., Un). In the fol-
lowing description we assume that user indices form a cycle such that U0 = Un
and Un+1 = U1.
[Round 1]. Each Ui computes yi = g
xi for some random xi ∈R Zq and
broadcasts (Ui, yi).
[Round 2]. Each Ui proceeds as follows:
– lets sidi = (U1|y1, ..., Un|yn),
– computes k′i−1,i = y
xi
i−1 and k
′
i,i+1 = y
xi
i+1,
– z′i−1,i = H(k
′
i−1,i, sidi) and z
′
i,i+1 = H(k
′
i,i+1, sidi),
– zi = z
′
i−1,i ⊕ z
′
i,i+1,
– σi = Sign(ski, (Ui, zi, sidi)),
– broadcasts (Ui, zi, σi).
[Group Key Computation]. Each Ui checks whether z1 ⊕ ...⊕ zn = 0 and
whether all received signatures σj are valid and aborts if any of these checks
fails. Otherwise, Ui proceeds as follows:
– iteratively for each j = i, ..., i+ n− 1, computes z′j,j+1 = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ zj
– accepts ki = Hg(z
′
1,2, ..., z
′
n,1, sidi) as the group session key.
P2P Stage
[P2P Key Computation]. On input any user identity Uj ∈ pidi the
corresponding user Ui proceeds as follows:
– computes k′i,j = y
xi
j = g
xixj ,
– accepts ki,j = Hp(k
′
i,j , Ui|yi, Uj |yj) as the two-party session key.
2.2 mBD+S Protocol
In this subsection, we briefly review the mBD+S protocol, which also includes
two stages: group stage and subgroup stage. Since the group stage of the mBD+S
protocol is same as that of the mBD+P protocol, here we omit the details. On
the correctness of key computation and the security analysis of the mBD+S
protocol refer to [3]. Next, we only introduce the subgroup stage.
Subgroup Stage On input any user identity spid ⊂ pid the corresponding users
perform the following steps. We assume that spid = (U1, ..., Um) with m < n
and that U0 = Um and Um+1 = U1.
[Round 1]. Each Ui ∈ spid proceeds as follows:
– extracts ssidi = (U1|y1, ..., Um|ym) from sidi,
– computes k′i−1,i = y
xi
i−1 and k
′
i,i+1 = y
xi
i+1,
– z′i−1,i = H(k
′
i−1,i, sidi) and z
′
i,i+1 = H(k
′
i,i+1, sidi),
– zi = z
′
i−1,i ⊕ z
′
i,i+1,
– σi = Sign(ski, (Ui, zi, ssidi)),
– broadcasts (Ui, zi, σi).
[Subgroup Key Computation]. Each Ui checks whether z1 ⊕ ...⊕ zm = 0
and whether all received signatures σj are valid and aborts if any of these
checks fails. Otherwise, Ui proceeds as follows:
– iteratively for each j = i, ..., i+m− 1, computes z′j,j+1 = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ zj
– accepts ki,J = Hs(z
′
1,2, ..., z
′
m,1, ssidi) as the subgroup session key.
3 Insider Attack on mBD+P and mBD+S Protocols
In this section, we propose our attack to the group stage of their protocols. Our
attack is similar to Lee and Lee’s cryptanalysis [5] on Jung’s scheme [6]. Under
our attack, two malicious insiders can victim a user to agree a different group
session key from other users. We note that this attack also can be mounted to
the subgroup stage in the similar way.
Suppose that users Ui−1 and Ui+1 are two malicious insiders. They are going
to deceive Ui into believing that Ui shares a common group session key with
other users after execution of the group stage of the mBD+P protocol or the
mBD+S protocol, while in fact Ui does not have the common group session key.
All group users honestly execute the protocol during setup phase. In the group
stage, two malicious insiders Ui−1 and Ui+1 try to disrupt the protocol as follows:
[Round 1]. Each Ul (for 1 ≤ l ≤ n) computes yl = g
xl for some random value
xl ∈R Zq and broadcasts (Ul, yl).
[Round 2]. Each Uj (for 1 ≤ j 6= i− 1, i+ 1 ≤ n) proceeds as follows:
– lets sidj = (U1|y1, ..., Un|yn),
– computes k′j−1,j = y
xj
j−1 and k
′
j,j+1 = y
xj
j+1,
– z′j−1,j = H(k
′
j−1,j , sidj) and z
′
j,j+1 = H(k
′
j,j+1, sidj),
– zj = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ z
′
j,j+1,
– σj = Sign(skj, (Uj , zj , sidj)),
– broadcasts (Uj , zj, σj) (for 1 ≤ j 6= i− 1, i+ 1 ≤ n).
Malicious insider Ui−1 proceeds as follows:
– lets sidi−1 = (U1|y1, ..., Un|yn),
– computes k′i−2,i−1 = y
xi−1
i−2 and k
′
i−1,i = y
xi−1
i ,
– z′i−2,i−1 = H(k
′
i−2,i−1, sidi−1) and z
′
i−1,i = H(k
′
i−1,i, sidi−1),
– zi−1 = z
′
i−2,i−1 ⊕ z
′
i−1,i ⊕ rM , where rM ∈R Zq chosen by Ui−1 and Ui+1.
– σi−1 = Sign(ski−1, (Ui−1, zi−1, sidi−1)),
– broadcasts (Ui−1, zi−1, σi−1).
Malicious insider Ui+1 proceeds as follows:
– lets sidi+1 = (U1|y1, ..., Un|yn),
– computes k′i,i+1 = y
xi+1
i and k
′
i+1,i+2 = y
xi+1
i+2 ,
– z′i,i+1 = H(k
′
i,i+1, sidi+1) and z
′
i+1,i+2 = H(k
′
i+1,i+2, sidi+1),
– zi+1 = z
′
i,i+1 ⊕ z
′
i+1,i+2 ⊕ rM , where rM ∈R Zq chosen by Ui−1 and Ui+1.
– σi+1 = Sign(ski+1, (Ui+1, zi+1, sidi+1))
– broadcasts (Ui+1, zi+1, σi+1).
[Group Key Computation]. Each Ul checks whether z1 ⊕ ...⊕ zn = 0 and
whether all received signatures σj are valid and aborts if any of these checks
fails. Otherwise, all group members except victim Ui proceed as follows:
– iteratively for each j = l, ..., l + n− 1, computes z′j,j+1 = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ zj
– accepts
kl = Hg(z
′
1,2, ..., z
′
i−2,i−1, z
′
i−1,i ⊕ rM , z
′
i,i+1 ⊕ rM , z
′
i+1,i+2, ..., z
′
n,1, sidl),
where 1 ≤ l 6= i ≤ n as the group session key.
Ui proceeds as follows:
– iteratively for each j = i, ..., i+ n− 1, computes z′j,j+1 = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ zj
– accepts ki =
Hg(z
′
1,2⊕rM , ..., z
′
i−2,i−1⊕rM , z
′
i−1,i, z
′
i,i+1, z
′
i+1,i+2⊕rM , ..., z
′
n,1⊕rM , sidi)
as the group session key.
Since Hg is a random oracle, it is obvious that the session key ki computed
by Ui is different from the group session key kl (for 1 ≤ l 6= i ≤ n) computed by
other users.
4 Improvement of mBD+P and mBD+S Protocols
In this section, we propose an effective countermeasure against malicious insider
attack. The main idea to prevent the malicious insider attack is that we add an
additional round for key confirmation to the group stage of the original mBD+P
and mBD+S protocols. In the improvement of mBD+P and mBD+S protocols
descriptions, we add two random oracles: H
′
g is a random oracle from {0, 1}
∗ to
{0, 1}2τ and Hkc is a random oracle from {0, 1}
∗ to {0, 1}τ . Next, we describe
the details of our improvement.
[Round 1]. Each Ui computes yi = g
xi for some random xi ∈R Zq and
broadcasts (Ui, yi).
[Round 2]. Each Ui proceeds as follows:
– lets sidi = (U1|y1, ..., Un|yn),
– computes k′i−1,i = y
xi
i−1 and k
′
i,i+1 = y
xi
i+1,
– z′i−1,i = H(k
′
i−1,i, sidi) and z
′
i,i+1 = H(k
′
i,i+1, sidi),
– zi = z
′
i−1,i ⊕ z
′
i,i+1,
– σi = Sign(ski, (Ui, zi, sidi)),
– broadcasts (Ui, zi, σi).
[Group Key Computation]. Each Ui checks whether z1 ⊕ ...⊕ zn = 0 and
whether all received signatures σj are valid and aborts if any of these checks
fails. Otherwise, Ui proceeds as follows:
– iteratively for each j = i, ..., i+ n− 1, computes z′j,j+1 = z
′
j−1,j ⊕ zj
– computes (ki, k
kc
i ) = H
′
g(z
′
1,2, ..., z
′
n,1, sidi).
[Key Confirmation Message]. Each Ui proceeds as follows:
– computes
Mi = Hkc(k
kc
i , sidi), σ
kc
i = Sign(ski, (Ui,Mi, sidi))
– broadcasts (Ui,Mi, σ
kc
i ).
[Round 3]. Each Ui checks whether Mi = Mj (for 1 ≤ j 6= i ≤ n) and whether
all received signatures σkcj are valid and aborts if any of these checks fails.
Otherwise, Ui completes the session by accepting ki as the common group
session key.
With this improvement, all group users can verify whether their group ses-
sion key are computed in the same key material and find whether there exists
malicious insiders. This simple countermeasure is also effective to the subgroup
stage of mBD+S protocol.
5 Conclusion
The design of secure GKE protocols has been proved to be a non-trivial task.
Many GKE protocols had appeared in the literature that subsequently were
proved to be flawed. In this paper, we point out that Abdalla et al.’s protocols
cannot satisfy a security goal, which is to make all group users share a common
group session key. The group stage and subgroup stage of their protocols suffer
from malicious insiders colluding attack. Two malicious insiders can cheat a
user into accepting a different session key from other users. Further, we propose
an improvement of their protocols with key confirmation to repair this security
weakness.
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